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CRITICALLY ACCLAIMED BUT NOT CRITICALLY
FOLLOWED-THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
TO FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIONS:
DOUGLAS COUNTY v. BABBITT
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Environmental Policy Act' (NEPA) imposes envi-
ronmental responsibility on all federal agencies.2 One important
NEPA provision requires preparation of environmental impact
statements prior to implementing certain agency actions. 3
Although the impact statement requirement pertains to many fed-
eral actions, courts have articulated instances where this procedure
does not apply.4 As a result of judicially created exemptions from
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), §§ 2-209, Pub. L. No.
91-190, 83 Stat. 852, (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1994), as
amended by 42 U.S.CA. §§ 4321-70 (West Supp. 1995)). NEPA is a broad federal
statute that applies to all federal agencies to ensure that they will address environ-
mental issues. Id. at § 102, § 4321. See H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.CA.N. 2751 (discussing purpose and need for
NEPA).
2. See NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332. NEPA has three major purposes: first, it
attempts to deter damage to the environment while "declar[ing a] national policy
encouraging harmony between humans and the environment;" second, the stat-
ute attempts to improve "understanding of the ecological systems and national
resources important to the Nation;" and third, NEPA establishes a Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ). Philip Michael Ferester, Article, Revitalizing the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law Adaptations from NEPA's Progeny, 16
HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 207, 207 n.6 (1992) (citing NEPA § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 4321).
The CEQ was created to oversee actions taken to enhance the environment. H.R.
REP. No. 378, supra note 1 at 1, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2751.
3. See NEPA § 102(2) (C); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C). For a discussion of envi-
ronmental impact statements, see infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
4. See Howard Geneslaw, Article, Cleanup of National Priorities List Sites, Func-
tional Equivalence and the NEPA Environmental Impact Statement, 10 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 127, 136-38 (1994). For example, NEPA provisions do not require im-
pact statements for insignificant or non-major federal actions. See NEPA
§ 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (stating impact statement is needed for "ma-
jor [flederal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment"). For a further discussion of NEPA § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C),
see infra note 34 and accompanying text.
Impact statements are not necessary when an agency's administrative statute
has a "clear and fundamental conflict" with NEPA. See Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v.
Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 791 (finding that timing requirements of
agency's enabling statute may not allow for preparation of impact statements),
reh 'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976). For a discussion of Flint Ridge, see infra notes 92-
96 and accompanying text. Furthermore, an impact statement is not needed when
such preparation would frustrate the purposes of both NEPA and the agency's
(339)
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NEPA, the question of NEPA's applicability to federal agency ac-
tions is a prevalent and problematic litigation issue.5 For instance,
many courts have found that Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) actions need not comply with NEPA's impact statement stan-
dards because EPA goals necessarily focus upon environmental
preservation. 6
The issue of NEPA compliance becomes more intriguing, how-
ever, when courts consider the extent of NEPA's applicability to
other federal agencies that address environmental issues.7 This par-
enabling statute. See Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996).
5. See Geneslaw, supra note 4, at 136-38. One commentator recognized that
while NEPA does not contain any explicit exemptions, three types of exclusions
have arisen. Id. at 134-39. The first exclusion arises when "provisions in other
statutes expressly [exempt] certain activities from [requiring] preparation of an
[impact statement] .. " Id. at 134. The second exemption stems from the "judi-
cially created 'functional equivalence' doctrine, which provides an exemption for
EPA if its review and comment procedures offer an effective substitute to an [im-
pact statement] .. " Id. at 134-35. The third "exemption from [impact state-
ment] preparation [has been recognized] ... in 'emergency circumstances.'" Id.
at 135. Another author addressed whether "environmental decision making [sic]
is best made by agencies alone or by agencies in partnership with the courts."
Linda M. Bolduan, Comment, The Ha field Riders: Eliminating the Role of Courts in
Environmental Decision Making, 20 ENvrL. L. 329, 332 (1990). Bolduan concluded
that the nature of environmental issues commands interaction between agencies
and the judiciary in environmental decisionmaking processes. Id. at 333, 375-76.
But seeWyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66, 73 (10th Cir. 1975) (Seth,J, dissenting)
(dissenting judge would require strict adherence to NEPA for all federal agencies
and would not allow judicially created exceptions to this rule), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
906 (1976).
6. See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 749-50 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Reaching
the conclusion that NEPA should not be applied to certain agency actions, courts
have created a functional equivalence test. These courts have determined that
virtually all EPA decisions will ultimately take environmental impacts into consider-
ation. Id. Accordingly, impact statements under NEPA are unnecessary for most
EPA actions. See, e.g., Hathaway, 525 F.2d at 71-72 (applying functional equivalence
test to EPA actions under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act);
Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (creat-
ing narrow exemption from NEPA for EPA decisions under § 111 of Clean Air
Act), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), appeal after remand sub nom. Portland Cement
Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1025 (1975), reh'g
denied, 423 U.S. 1092 (1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Blum, 458 F.
Supp. 650, 661 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding functional equivalence means agency con-
sidered NEPA's five core issues); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489
F.2d 1247, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (applying functional equivalence test to agencies
"engaged primarily in an examination of environmental questions"); Warren
County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 286-87 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (finding func-
tional equivalence test exempts EPA from preparing impact statements).
7. See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 381. In a Senate debate regarding § 102 of
NEPA, conferees stated that this particular section of NEPA should guarantee that
federal agencies that do not normally consider environmental issues will evaluate
these concerns. Id. (citing 115 CONG. REc. 40,418 (1969)). See e.g., Thomas v. Pe-
terson, 589 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (D. Idaho 1984) (involving action against Forest
2
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ticular conflict was addressed in Douglas County v. Babbitt8 (Douglas
County I). In Douglas County II, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit evaluated the extent to which NEPA require-
ments should apply to the Department of the Interior's (DOI) ac-
tion under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 9 Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit decided whether NEPA's requirement that all federal
agencies prepare an environmental impact statement for "every rec-
ommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other ma-
jor Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment" applied to the Secretary of the Interior's (Secretary)
designation of a critical habitat under ESA.10 Interpreting both
NEPA and ESA, the Ninth Circuit concluded that NEPA did not
Service for building road without preparing impact statement), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part and remanded, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985), and appeal after remand, 841 F.2d
332 (9th Cir. 1988); National Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v.
United States Dept. of State, 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1228 (D.D.C. 1978) (involving
action against Department of State, Agency for International Development, and
Drug Enforcement Agency for failing to furnish impact statement for United
States participation in herbicide spraying program); City of Irving, Tex. v. FAA,
539 F. Supp. 17, 19 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (concerning action against Federal Aviation
Administration for not preparing impact statement when temporarily testing
runway).
It should be noted that NEPA does not contain any express exemption lan-
guage for any agency. See NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2767, 2769-70. Due
to the lack of an express exemption, questions have arisen regarding an implied
exception from NEPA. See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 381 (suggesting that func-
tional equivalence standard would afford some agencies leniency). Such an impli-
cation could arise when a court evaluates the type of agency action and the
procedures in the agency's administrative statute, and concludes either that ade-
quate environmental concerns will be addressed without guidance from NEPA or
that there should be a strict adherence to NEPA in all circumstances. Id. (citing
Major Changes in S. 1075 as passed by Senate 115 CONG. REc. 40,417-18 (1969)).
8. 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996). The district
court decision was Douglas County v. Lujan (Douglas County 1), 810 F. Supp. 1470
(D. Or. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Douglas County v. Babbitt (Douglas County
I), 48 F.3d 1498 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denieA 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996). Between the
time of the lower court decision and the Ninth Circuit appeal, a new Secretary of
the Interior was appointed. Therefore, the new Secretary, Bruce Babbitt, replaced
Manuel Lujan, Jr. as the defendant in the circuit court case. See Douglas County II,
48 F.3d at 1499 n.2.
9. Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994); as amended by 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-44
(West Supp. 1995)). See Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1499.
10. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1497 (quoting NEPA § 102(2) (C); 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2) (C)). The Secretary of the Interior has the authority to list endangered
species and designate critical habitats under ESA. ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(15).
See also Nancy K. Kubasek & M. Neil Browne, Article, The Endangered Species Act: An
Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 3 DICK.J. ENWTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (Spring 1994).
The Secretary delegates this authority to the Fish and Wildlife Service. Kubasek,
supra at 2. For purposes of this Note, the term "the Secretary" will refer to both the
Secretary of the Interior and the Fish and Wildlife Service.
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apply to the critical habitat designation."1 The court's conclusion
was based on three factors. 12 First, Congress intended for ESA criti-
cal habitat provisions to supersede NEPA procedures.13 Second,
NEPA only applies to alterations in the physical environment.1 4
Third, applying NEPA to critical habitat designations would frus-
trate purposes of both of the statutes.15
This Note focuses on the applicability of NEPA to specific fed-
eral agency actions. It concentrates on an agency's duty to comply
with NEPA when its administrative statute already addresses envi-
ronmental concerns. Section II presents the facts of Douglas County
I.16 Section III then examines the history and development of
NEPA and ESA. 17 Next, Section IV discusses the Ninth Circuit's
holding and reasoning in Douglas County II.18 In addition, Section
V critically analyzes an alternate rationale supporting the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision. 19 Finally, Section VI concludes this note with an
assessment of the impact of the Ninth Circuit's holding on both
government agencies and the public. 20
11. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1501-08. The court acknowledged the impor-
tance of protecting old growth forests from possible demise, and stated that it was
reluctant "to make NEPA more of an 'obstructionist tactic' to prevent environmen-
tal protection that it may already have become." Id. at 1508. But see Catran County
Board of Comm'r, New Mexico v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 75 F.3d
1429 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding Secretary of Interior must comply with NEPA when
designated a critical habitat under ESA).
12. Id. at 1507-08. The court engaged in an in-depth analysis of NEPA and
ESA. First, the court concluded that ESA methods replaced NEPA procedures. Id.
at 1502-05. Next, the court acknowledged that regardless of ESA procedures an
impact statement was not required because the critical habitat designation did not
change the physical environment. Id. at 1505-06. Finally, the court found that
ESA supplements NEPA without requiring an impact statement. Id. at 1506-07.
13. Id. at 1502-05. The Ninth Circuit focused on the legislative history and
the plain text of the two statutes to conclude that the critical habitat designation
process was governed by ESA, and thus was not subject to NEPA procedures. Id.
For a discussion of critical habitats, see infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
14. Id. at 1505-06. See also Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear
Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983); Sabine River Auth. v. United States Dept. of Interior,
951 F.2d 669 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 823 (1992).
15. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1506-07.
16. For a discussion of the facts of Douglas County II, see infra notes 21-34 and
accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the legislative history of NEPA and ESA, see infra notes
35-54 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Douglas County II, see
infra notes 109-32 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the functional equivalence test, see infra notes 143-57
and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the effect of the Ninth Circuit's holding on the appli-
cability of NEPA to federal agency actions, see infra notes 158-72 and accompany-
ing text.
4
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II. FACTS
The Douglas County II litigation arose out of public interest in
preserving the Northern Spotted Owl. 21 In response to this widely
held concern, the Secretary of the Interior listed the owl as an en-
dangered species.22 The Secretary did not, however, designate a
critical habitat for the owl, and environmentalists subsequently
brought an action to compel the designation.23 Pursuant to a court
21. See Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1498 (citing Northern Spotted Owl v. Ho-
del, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988). Since 1973, government officials have
identified the Northern Spotted Owl as a "species in need of protection." John
Lowe Weston, Comment, The Endangered Species Committee and the Northern Spotted
Owl: Did the "God Squad"Play God?, 7 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 779, 794 (Fall 1993/Winter
1994). Additional scientific research has revealed a close relationship between the
owl and old-growth forests because the Northern Spotted Owl's primary habitat is
in the old-growth forests of the Pacific Northwest. Id.
In Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. at 480, a number of environmen-
tal groups brought an action challenging the Secretary's decision not to list the
Northern Spotted Owl as an endangered species. Under ESA, an endangered spe-
cies listing for the owl would also trigger a critical habitat designation within the
old-growth forest area. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 623-
25 (W.D. Wash. 1991). Since loggers use these forests to gather high-quality lum-
ber for their timber companies, heightened interest in the owl has placed the spe-
cies "squarely in the center of an economic-benefit-of-preservation versus
economic-cost-of-preservation controversy." Weston, supra at 794.
22. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1498 (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990)).
The listing process under ESA has been recognized as a "truly remarkable effort"
by the Department of the Interior because of the great amount of concern ex-
pressed for preservation of the Northern Spotted Owl. Northern Spotted Owl v. Lu-
jan, 758 F. Supp. at 629. In April 1990, the Secretary began plans to list the owl as
an endangered species. Weston, supra note 21, at 797. In June 1990, the Secretary
published the final listing rule. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990).
23. See Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1498-99. In Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan,
environmentalists initiated an action to force the Secretary to designate a critical
habitat for the owl. 758 F. Supp. at 622. These activists contended that the critical
habitat was ascertainable and, therefore, the Secretary was obligated to designate
that habitat. Id. at 623-24. The Secretary argued that the critical habitat was not
discernable at the time of the listing. Id.
ESA requires the Secretary to designate a critical habitat concurrently with an
endangered species listing. ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (3). If, however, a critical
habitat is unascertainable during the listing process, the Secretary must provide
sufficient reasons for not designating a habitat at that time. See 50 C.F.R.
§ 424.12(a) (1994). See alsoJames Salzman, Article, Evolution and Application of Crit-
ical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 14 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 311, 331
(1990) (stating if species' critical habitat is "deemed imprudent or indetermin-
able" designations are not made). Further, under ESA the Secretary must use the
"best scientific and commercial data available" when determining a critical habitat.
See ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a). The Secretary
stated that a critical habitat was not "determinable" at the time of the listing. North-
ern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. at 623. Nonetheless, the district court charac-
terized critical habitat designations as "central component[s] of the legal scheme
developed by Congress to prevent the permanent loss of species." Id. at 629. Ac-
cordingly, the court ordered the Secretary to submit a written report and publish a
proposed designation. Id. at 629-30.
1996] 343
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order, the Secretary conducted several public hearings and devel-
oped a final designation of a critical habitat which consisted en-
tirely of federal land.2 4 The Secretary concluded that, for this
assignment, it was not necessary to prepare either an environmental
assessment, or an environmental impact statement pursuant to
NEPA.25
In September 1991, Douglas County filed an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon.26 The
County sought a declaratory judgment against the Secretary for vio-
lating NEPA and ESA requirements. Moreover, the County re-
quested an injunction to prevent the Secretary from designating a
critical habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl until either a NEPA
environmental assessment or a NEPA environmental impact state-
24. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1498. The Secretary's initial proposal, pub-
lished on May 6, 1991, was based on a preliminary economic analysis. Douglas
County , 810 F. Supp. at 1472. In this designation, the critical habitat consisted of
federal, state, and privately owned land. See Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1498 (cit-
ing 56 Fed. Reg. 20,816 (1991)). After this proposal, the Secretary held four pub-
lic meetings and elicited public response. Id. Subsequent to the comment period,
the Secretary prepared another economic analysis that took into account employ-
ment and financial considerations in the timber industry of the local and state
areas. Douglas County 1, 810 F. Supp. at 1473. On August 13, 1991, the Secretary
issued a revised designation of critical habitat eliminating all privately owned lands
and a majority of state owned land. Id. (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 40,002 (1991)). On
January 15, 1992, following a comment period and four more public hearings, the
Secretary established a final rule of critical habitat for the Northern Spotted Owl.
Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1498 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 1,796 (1992)). This designa-
tion consisted of approximately 6.9 million acres of old-growth forest that elimi-
nated all private, tribal, state, and non-federal land. Id.
25. Id. at 1498 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 20,824 (1991)). The Secretary based his
decision not to prepare an impact statement on Sixth Circuit precedent holding
that endangered species listings under ESA are not subject to NEPA and a letter
from the Council of Environmental Quality that "urged the Secretary to cease pre-
paring EISs [sic] in conjunction with actions under § 4 of the ESA." Id. (citing 48
Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983)). See also Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829,
838 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that because NEPA impact statement requirements
conflict with ESA it is not necessary for endangered species listing); Andrus v. Si-
erra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (concluding that Council on Environmental
Quality's interpretation of NEPA is "entitled to substantial deference").
26. Douglas County I, 810 F. Supp. at 1472. A common complaint with respect
to critical habitat designations is that these land distributions can obstruct local
progress and development. See Salzman, supra note 23, at 335-39 (identifying
.sources of opposition" to critical habitat designations); Weston, supra note 21, at
794-95 (discussing economic impacts on local loggers resulting from limited use of
old-growth forests). Douglas County brought an action because the critical habitat
designation would "profoundly affect the quality of life in Douglas County. .. ."
Douglas County I, 810 F. Supp. 1476. Therefore, the district court determined that
Douglas County had standing to bring the claims. Id. at 1476-77. For a discussion
of standing, see infra note 34 and accompanying text.
6
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ment was prepared.2 7 In granting summary judgment in favor of
Douglas County, the district court concluded that: (1) the Secretary
did not violate ESA because the critical habitat designation ade-
quately considered various impacts on the County and on other
wildlife; (2) Douglas County had standing to bring NEPA claims
against the Secretary; and (3) the Secretary violated NEPA by
designating a critical habitat without preparing either an environ-
mental assessment or an environmental impact statement.28
The Secretary appealed to the Ninth Circuit arguing that
Douglas County did not have standing to bring NEPA claims, and
further, that ESA procedures override NEPA procedures. 29 The
Secretary, therefore, contended that an environmental impact
statement need not be issued prior to specifying the critical
habitat.30 The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded for further consideration. 31 The court agreed with
the Secretary's critical habitat argument, and found that the district
27. Douglas County 1, 810 F. Supp. at 1474. Douglas County presented four
claims which focused on the Secretary's failure to comply with NEPA when
designating the critical habitat: (1) failure to develop a range of alternatives; (2)
failure to identify and disclose a "cumulative impact" of the designation; (3) failure
to examine effects of the designation on other wildlife; and (4) failure to consider
social and economic impacts of the designation. Id. As a remedy, Douglas County
sought an injunction preventing the critical habitat designation from going into
effect until the Secretary prepared an environmental impact statement in compli-
ance with NEPA. Id. at 1474. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. Id. at 1472.
28. Id. at 1474-87. The district court strictly viewed NEPA as requiring all
federal agencies to comply with the Act when considering implementation of ma-
jor federal actions "unless there is a clear and unavoidable statutory conflict." Id.
at 1484. Therefore, the court found that Douglas County's economic hardship
invoked necessary compliance with NEPA. Id. at 1484. Accordingly, the court
granted summary judgment for the County and provided injunctive relief by set-
ting aside the critical habitat designation until the Secretary complied with NEPA.
Id. at 1484. The district court later stayed the injunctive order pending appeal.
Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1499. See, e.g., National Org. for the Reform of Mari-
juana Laws v. United States Dept. of State (NORML), 452 F. Supp. 1226, 1234
(D.D.C. 1978) (finding remedy "enjoining the proposed federal action and order-
ing the preparation of an adequate impact statement ... is insufficient because,
except by deterrence, it does nothing to further early consideration of environ-
mental factors").
29. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1499. The Secretary and Headwater, Inc.
joined as appellants. Id. Douglas County was joined by Northwest Forest Resource
Council, Douglas Timber Operators, Southern Forest Products Association, South-
ern Timber Purchasers Council, and American Forest & Paper Association as ap-
pellees. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1508. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court holding that
Douglas County had standing to bring NEPA claims. Id. at 1501. However, the
court reversed the lower court's decision and held that NEPA does not apply to
critical habitat designations. Id. at 1507-08.
1996]
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court erred by concluding that NEPA applied to the designation of
a critical habitat.32 Accordingly, the court reversed that portion of
the district court's decision and held that: (1) ESA's critical habitat
provisions superseded NEPA procedures; and (2) NEPA require-
ments do not apply to actions that do not modify the physical envi-
ronment.33 The Ninth Circuit did, however, affirm the district
court's ruling that Douglas County had standing to bring NEPA
claims against the Secretary. 34
32. Id. at 1507.
33. Id. at 1507-08.
34. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1501. The first issue the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed in Douglas County Ilwas whether Douglas County had standing to assert an
action against the Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 1499. The United States
Supreme Court has recognized three requirements for standing under Article III
of the Constitution. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61
(1992)); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. First, the plaintiff must suffer an
"injury in fact." Id. (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560). This includes a
.concrete and particularized" or "actual or imminent" injury of a legally protected
interest. Id. Next, "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of." Id. Finally, there must be a likelihood that "the injury
will be 'redressed by favorable decision.'" Id. (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
at 561).
Once constitutional requirements for standing are met, a plaintiff challenging
a statute, such as NEPA, must also satisfy the zone of interests test under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA) by showing "that the injury he or she has suf-
fered falls within the 'zone of interests' that the statute was designed to protect."
Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1499. See 5 U.S.C. § 551. See also Nevada Land Action
Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
claims to protect purely economic interests and lifestyle do not elicit standing
under NEPA); Bennett v. Plenert, 63 F.3d 915, 921-22 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding
plaintiffs, asserting no interest in preserving endangered species, did not satisfy
zone of interests test under APA).
According to Defenders of Wildlife, the plaintiff must show two elements to es-
tablish procedural standing. Id. First, the plaintiff must have a procedural right to
protect a concrete interest. Id. Second, that concrete interest must be threatened.
Id. (citing Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 572-73 nn. 7-8). The Ninth Circuit first
found that Douglas County exhibited a procedural right. Id. at 1501. NEPA allows
local agencies to respond to proposed federal actions. Id. (citing NEPA
§ 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). Douglas County is such an agency. Id. (cit-
ing OR. Rv. STAT. § 197.175 (1993) (authorizing counties to "prepare, adopt,
amend and revise" environmental standards within land management plans)).
Next, the court concluded that the County had a concrete interest that could be
harmed because its adjoining lands could be threatened by the government's criti-
cal habitat designation. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1501. Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit held that Douglas County met the constitutional requirements for proce-
dural standing, satisfied the zone of interests test based on a procedural injury
resulting from the "failure to prepare an environmental document that explores a
range of alternatives and cumulative facts," and demonstrated a concrete interest
that could be adversely affected by the critical habitat designation. Douglas County
II, 48 F.3d at 1501. See also Linda M. Barone, Note, Loggers or Woodpeckers: Who's
Endangered Now?: Region 8 Forest Service Timber Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 5 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 529 (1994) (discussing whether timber companies have standing to
bring claims against United States Forest Service); Martha Colhoun & Timothy S.
Hamill, Comment, Environmental Standing in the Ninth Circuit: Wading Through the
8
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Statutory Provisions
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
NEPA provides the procedural framework that federal agencies
must employ to assess the environmental consequences of certain
actions. 35 NEPA forces a government agency that initiates a federal
action to develop and consider extensive information regarding en-
vironmental concerns. However, the statute does not require an
agency to reach a particular substantive result for environmental
protection.3 6 Initially, under NEPA, an agency that proposes either
Quagmire, 15 PUB. LAND L. REv. 249 (1994) (addressing Ninth Circuit standing
requirements); Bill J. Hays, Comment, Standing and Environmental Law:Judicial Pol-
icy and the Impact of Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 39 U. KAN. L. REv. 997
(Summer 1991) (addressing implications ofjudicial methodology on standing doc-
trine under ESA).
35. NEPA §§ 2, 101-02, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-32. See also Bolduan, supra
note 5, at 330. Section 102 of NEPA provides in pertinent part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible:
(1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be
interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in
this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the federal government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach . . .in plan-
ning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's
environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures .... which
will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and
values may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmaking
along with economic and technical considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and any other major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement
made by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short term uses of man's en-
vironment and the maintenance and enhancement of long term
productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
... [if] the proposed action [is] implemented.
NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
This section further states that federal agencies must consult with one another
and the public before finalizing a major project. Id. § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2) (C).
36. Andrea L. Hungerford, Note, Changing the Management of Public Land For-
ests: The Role of Spotted Owl Injunctions, 24 ENVrL. L. 1395, 1401 (1994). In Robert-
son v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989), the Supreme
Court found that while NEPA establishes "procedures [that] are almost certain to
affect the agency's substantive decision, it is now well settled that NEPA itself does
not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes a necessary process." There-
fore, if an agency identifies and evaluates any possible consequences to the envi-
1996]
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legislation or government action that may affect the environment
must conduct an environmental assessment.3 7 Based upon the re-
sults of this assessment, the agency may make a finding of no signifi-
cant impact and decide not to prepare an environmental impact
statement.3 8 Alternatively, if the assessment reveals a significant ef-
fect on the environment, the federal agency must prepare an envi-
ronmental impact statement.39
The primary purposes of environmental impact statements are:
(1) to detail possible economic and environmental effects of the
proposed federal action on others;4° and (2) to afford sufficient
ronment that may be caused by the proposed action, "the agency is not
constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental
costs," because NEPA prohibits uniformed as opposed to unwise agency actions.
Id. at 350-51 (citations omitted).
37. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1498 (citing NEPA § 102(2)(E), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332 (2) (E)). NEPA's process begins with a brief analysis to determine the need
for an impact statement. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2. Regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to NEPA define an environmental assessment as a "concise public document"
where a federal agency "provide[s] sufficient evidence and analysis for determin-
ing whether to prepare an environmental impact statement or [make] a finding of
no significant impact." Id. at § 1508.9(a) (1). Additionally, the assessment must
discuss possible alternatives to the action. Id. at § 1508.9(b). The main purpose of
an environmental assessment is to determine whether the proposed action will
cause a significant impact on the environment. Id. at § 1501.3. Therefore, it helps
federal agencies foresee the necessity for environmental impact statements and
identify possible alternatives to the proposed action. See NEPA § 102(2)(E), 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3, 1501.4.
38. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13. An impact statement is not necessary for federal ac-
tions that do not create a significant impact on the environment. See Sabine River
Auth. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 680 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 823 (1992). However, to justify reaching a finding of no significant im-
pact the federal agency must provide reasons why the action will not have a serious
effect on the environment and must refer to any documents used to support that
conclusion. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13. Once an agency makes a finding that the federal
action will not have a significant impact on the environment it must also make that
decision available to the public. Id. at § 1501.4(e) (1). Further, if the decision not
to prepare an impact statement is without precedent or closely resembles an action
that normally requires an impact statement, the decision must be made available
for review and comment. Id. at 1501.4(e) (2).
39. See generally NEPA § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (statutory require-
ments for environmental impact statements); 40 C.F.R. § 1502 (detailing purposes
and process for completing environmental impact statement). The environmental
impact statement is a detailed document devised to "assure that agencies give
proper consideration to the environmental consequences of their actions." Mer-
rell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 777-78 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987) (citations omitted). Additionally, the statement alerts the public and other
federal agencies of the proposed action, and allows them to be active in the deci-
sion making process. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 349 (1989).
40. See NEPA § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. The
statement should recognize both direct and indirect effects. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8.
Regulations pursuant to NEPA define direct effects as those "caused by the action
and occur[ring] at the same time and place." Id. at § 1508.8(a). Indirect actions
10
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channels for feedback between the federal agency and interested
parties. 4' Therefore, a properly designed environmental impact
statement lists the alternatives to the proposed federal action,
reveals potential effects on the surroundings by the action, and
takes into account public response to the possible action.42
2. Endangered Species Act of 1973
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)
to provide for the conservation of vanishing species of fish and wild-
life.43 The primary goal of ESA is to accommodate listed species
are explained as those that are a result of the action, but take place "later in time
or [are] farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable." Id. at
1508.8(b). Further, an impact statement should analyze beneficial effects as well
as detrimental costs to the environment. Id. For a further discussion of beneficial
environmental impacts, see infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
41. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.19. Adequate feedback is accomplished by circulating
the proposal and allowing substantive comments pertaining to the federal action.
Id. All agencies are required to provide the entire impact statement to certain
interested parties. Id. These groups include: federal agencies authorized to de-
velop and maintain environmental standards, the applicant requesting the state-
ment, any interested party requesting a copy of the statement, and organizations
submitting substantive comments on the draft. Id. Before preparing the final
draft of the impact statement, the agency should invite specific comments from
federal, state, and local agencies and other interested parties regarding the pro-
posed action. Id. at § 1503.1. These comments should be taken into account
when the agency prepares the final draft of the federal project. Id. at § 1503.4.
42. See Hungerford, supra note 36, at 1400. The environmental impact state-
ment serves the purpose of providing information to allow "agency officials make
the best informed decisions based upon an understanding of the environmental
consequences of their actions." Bolduan, supra note 5, at 331. When making a
decision an agency must be able to weigh possible alternatives to the proposed
action. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. The alternatives section of an impact statement is
considered "the heart of the impact statement." Id. This component of the state-
ment allows the agency to "rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reason-
able alternatives" to the action by extensively detailing each possibility and
allowing for a comparative evaluation. Id. See generally Clay Hartmann, Comment,
NEPA: Business as Usual: The Weaknesses of the National Environmental Policy Act, 59 J.
AIR L. & COM. 709 (Feb. 1994) (finding that case law demonstrates federal agen-
cies have failed to treat alternatives section in impact statements with importance
they demand).
Another important factor of an impact statement is public involvement. 40
C.F.R. § 1506.6. This aspect of the statement process entails providing effected
parties with public notice of hearings, and allowing for public comments on the
proposed action. Id. at § 1506.6(b).
43. ESA § 2, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). Congress developed ESA as a procedure for
federal agencies to maintain critical habitats and preserve continued existence of
threatened species. H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9455. In ESA, Congress aimed to protect ecosystems; the
critical habitat provisions effectuate this goal. Kubasek, supra note 10, at 8. The
main purpose of ESA is to "prevent animal and plant species endangerment and
extinction caused by man's influence on ecosystems, and to return the species to
the point where they are viable components of their ecosystems .... " H.R. REP.
No. 1625, at 5.
19961
11
Payne: Critically Acclaimed but Not Critically Followed - The Inapplicab
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
350 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. VII: p. 339
until they are no longer in threat of extinction. 44 To achieve this
goal, resources necessary to prevent further diminution are devoted
to a threatened species; thus, the imperiled class is given highest
priority.45
In addition to the ESA listing process, the statute mandates
critical habitat designations for endangered species. 46 Section 3 of
ESA defines critical habitat as specific areas "essential to the conser-
vation" of endangered species and regions "which may require spe-
cial management considerations or protection."47 Under ESA, the
Prior to the 1973 legislation, Congress developed two other endangered spe-
cies acts. See Ike C. Sugg, Article, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species
Act, Its Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REv. 1, 17-22 (1993). The
first major action to protect species at risk of extinction occurred in 1966 with the
enactment of the Endangered Species Preservation Act (ESPA). Endangered Spe-
cies Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (repealed 1973).
This legislation merely required the Secretary to administer preservation plans
when "practicable." Weston, supra note 21, at 783. Due to ESPA deficiencies, in
1969, Congress created the Endangered Species Conservation Act (ESCA). Endan-
gered Species Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (repealed 1973).
While ESCA was more comprehensive than ESPA because it broadened the defini-
tion of wildlife and allowed the government to purchase private lands for preserva-
tion purposes, it did not eliminate the practicability test implemented in ESPA.
Weston, supra note 21, at 783. Accordingly, ESCA failed to "provide the kind of
management tools needed to act early enough to save a vanishing species." Sugg,
supra at 21. In 1973, ESA repealed ESPA, and expanded federal obligations to list
species and federal programs to help guarantee the continued existence of spe-
cies. H.R. REP. No. 1625, at 5. Unlike ESPA and ESCA, the 1973 legislation "en-
compassed protection for nearly all species" and augmented this conservation to
include critical habitat designations. Weston, supra note 21, at 784-85. Following
the 1973 Act, Congress amended the legislation in 1978, 1979 and 1982. See id. at
788-794.
44. See H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 43, at 5-6, rprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9455-56. This report specifically details the need for endangered
species legislation to protect animals and plants from extinction. Id. at 5, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9455. The conferees recognized that listing and designat-
ing habitats for threatened species affords the government a chance to pay particu-
lar attention to the jeopardized class and to focus upon returning the species to a
"healthy state." Id. at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9456.
45. See H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 43, at 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 9460. In Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, the Supreme Court suspended the con-
struction of the Tellico Dam because its continued erection would jeopardize the
preservation of the snail darter. 437 U.S. 153, 172-74 (1978). The Court found
that although stopping the construction would sacrifice millions of dollars in pub-
lic funds, ESA clearly affords endangered species "the highest of priorities." Id. at
174. Further, the Supreme Court concluded that its decision to terminate the dam
construction was supported by congressional intent to "halt and reverse the trend
toward species extinction, whatever the cost." Id. at, 184.
46. See ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533.
47. ESA § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i). House Conference Report 1804 de-
fined critical habitat to include certain areas within the geographic region occu-
pied by a listed species that are crucial to preserve the species and that necessitate
special management considerations. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9484, 9485. This report further rec-
12
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Secretary allocates land for critical habitats based on "the best scien-
tific data available after taking into consideration the economic im-
pact and any other relevant impact" on the environment.48 The
general purpose of these designations is to ensure that a proposed
federal action will neither imperil the existence of any remaining
endangered species nor adversely alter the species' living
environment.49
Ironically, when it initially enacted ESA in 1973, Congress did
not place particular importance on critical habitat designations. 50
These land designations were viewed as only one of a number of
ESA enforcement mechanisms.51 Five years later, Congress recog-
ommended that the Secretary be given power to designate critical habitats outside
of the geographic area occupied by the species, if such regions are paramount to
the species' conservation. Id. Under a theory of "irresolvable conflict," the confer-
ees proposed that the Secretary be given discretion for such designations when "an
agency's action would jeopardize the continued existence of a threatened or en-
dangered species or result in the adverse modification or destruction of a critical
habitat." Id. See also 50 C.F.R. § 424.02 (defining critical habitat); 50 C.F.R
§ 424.12 (listing criteria to designate critical habitats).
48. ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2). Prior to the 1978 amendments of ESA,
critical habitat determinations were based entirely on biological assessments. H.R.
REP. No. 1625, supra note 43, at 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9467. House
Report 1625 provides guidance for the Secretary to take economics and other im-
pacts into account before designating a critical habitat. Id. The conferees noted,
however, that the final decision is purely within the Secretary's discretion. Id.
49. ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). In Douglas County II, the County raised
concerns about its proprietary interest in lands adjacent to the critical habitat
designation for the Northern Spotted Owl. See Douglas County I, 48 F.3d at 1501.
The County's primary contention in Douglas County II, was that while a critical
habitat was designated pursuant to ESA, an impact statement was not properly
prepared in accordance with NEPA. Id. at 1501-05.
Similarly, in Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473, 1476
(W.D. Wash. 1992), aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom., Seattle Audubon
v. Epsy, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1993), citizen action groups challenged the legality
of an environmental impact statement prepared by the Forest Service regarding
critical habitat of the Northern Spotted Owl. The Audubon Society specifically
contested the deficiency of assessing the environmental repercussions on the owl if
logging continued in the critical habitat area. Id. The district court decided that
once an impact statement is prepared, "logging may be allowed under ESA" if a
timber company's program is consistent with the purpose of ESA § 7, and there-
fore, does not have negative effects on the designated critical habitat for the spot-
ted owl. Id. at 1483.
50. See H.R_ REP. No. 1625, supra note 43, at 7-8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 9458. Critical habitat designations were neither defined nor required under the
original ESA legislation. Id. The concept was, however, explained in the regula-
tions pursuant to the Act as "[a]ir, land or water areas ... the loss of which would
appreciably decrease the likelihood of the survival and recovery of a listed species
or a distinct segment of its population .. " Id.
51. Salzman, supra note 23, at 311. Salzman notes that § 7 of ESA was not
originally perceived as a central component of the 1973 version of ESA. Id. at 315.
Only two sentences long, the provision required all federal agencies, in
consultation with the Secretary of the Interior or of Commerce, to take
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nized the loss of habitat as a common predicate to species extinc-
tion. 52 Accordingly, in the 1978 amendments to ESA, Congress
reevaluated the importance of critical habitat designations. 53 As a
result of the high priority Congress placed on the maintenance of
endangered species' habitats, ESA now requires a critical living area
to be designated at the same time as an endangered species
listing.54
'such action necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or car-
ried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of such en-
dangered species or result in the destruction or modification of habitat of
such species which is determined by the Secretary ... to be critical.'
Id. (citing ESA § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)). The 1978 amendments reflect Con-
gress's new view of the significance of critical habitat designations by describing § 7
as "one small section [that] has developed into one of the most significant por-
tions of the entire statute." H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 43, at 7, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9457.
52. See Oliver A. Houck, Article, The Endangered Species Act and its Implementa-
tion by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. CoLo. L. REv. 277, 296
(1993) (discussing critical habitat designations). The importance of habitat for
species' survival is undeniable. See H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 43, at 5, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. at 9455 (discussing congressional concern for deteriorating
species' habitats). In fact, loss of habitat has been infamously known as the promi-
nent cause of vanishing species. Id. One commentator has noted, however, that
while critical habitat designations are important, they have also been recognized as
"the ESA's most controversial and influential enforcement tool." Salzman, supra
note 23, at 311. Thus, critical habitat designations have been greatly criticized by
"government officials, environmentalists, and local interests [because] . . .
[diepending upon one's perspective, critical habitat[s] either [do] not provide
enough protection or [they go] too far in hindering local development and
growth." Id. at 335.
53. See ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533. Specifically noting that the loss of habitat is
"universally cited as the major cause for the extinction of species worldwide," Con-
gress acknowledged the causal relationship between human alteration of natural
habitats and species' demise. H.R. REP. No. 1625, supra note 43, at 5, reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.CA.N. at 9455. Accordingly, in 1978, critical habitat designations be-
came an integral part of the endangered species listing process. See ESA § 4, 16
U.S.C. § 1533.
54. ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). The Secretary of the Interior has the
important role of listing endangered species and designating critical habitats. Id.
While there are instances where the Secretary does not designate a critical habitat
concurrently with a listing, legislative history supports the contention that a critical
habitat designation should coincide with an endangered species listing. See H.Rl
REP. No. 1625, supra note 43, at 16-17, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. at 9466-67.
Specifically, House Report 1625 notes that the phrase "to the maximum extent
prudent" in § 1533 gives the Secretary discretion to delay designating a critical
habitat at the same time as the listing in rare cases for the "best interests of the
species." Id. at 9466. See also Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621,
624-25 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (compelling Secretary of Interior to designate critical
habitat after listing Northern Spotted Owl as endangered).
14
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol7/iss2/4
1DOUGLAS COUNTY
B. Preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement Under
NEPA
As a general rule, federal agencies are required to follow
NEPA's procedural provisions. 55 An exception to this rule emerges,
however, when there is an evident and unavoidable conflict be-
tween the agency's administrative statute and NEPA procedures. 56
These statutory conflicts frequently arise either when an agency's
enabling legislation provides adequate procedures to nullify NEPA
requirements, or when the application of NEPA frustrates the gen-
eral purposes of both statutes. 57
1. Wen is an Environmental Impact Statement Necessary?
Section 102(2) (C) of NEPA provides a guideline for federal
agencies to use when determining whether an environmental im-
pact statement is necessary.58 According to section 102(2) (C), an
environmental impact statement is required for major federal
projects "significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
55. NEPA § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C). NEPA's impact statement re-
quirement applies to all federal agencies whether or not their administrative stat-
ute allows for environmental evaluations. Silvia M. Riechel, Note, Government
Hypocrisy and the Extraterritorial Application of NEPA, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 115,
121 (Winter 1994) (quoting Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION: THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT § 1:03 (1984)). This author further notes
that "NEPA does not contain exemptions for any federal activities." Id. Moreover,
the statute encourages the government to take any rational measures to preserve
the environment. Id.
56. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, supra note 7, at 9, reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.CA.N. at 2770. Section 102 details when a federal agency need not follow
NEPA mandates. See NEPA § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C). For a further
discussion of the "to the fullest extent possible" language of NEPA § 102, see infra
notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
57. See Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1986) (addressing reso-
lution of conflict between requirements of NEPA and FIFRA), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
332 (1989). For a further discussion of Merrell, see infra notes 76-83 and accompa-
nying text.
58. See NEPA § 102(2) (C); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C).
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ment.'' 59 In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Vaughn,60 the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia analyzed
NEPA's environmental impact statement requirement.61  In
Vaughn, several interested parties sought an injunction against the
Department of Energy to enjoin the restart of a nuclear reactor un-
til an environmental impact statement was prepared.62 The court
determined that, on its face, the restart of a nuclear reactor would
create direct effects on the environment significant enough to ne-
cessitate an impact statement analysis.63 After evaluating the possi-
bility of environmental consequences associated with the operation
of a nuclear reactor, the district court ordered the Department of
Energy to prepare and file an environmental impact statement.64
59. Id. This section of NEPA establishes the significant impact test that is tra-
ditionally used to determine whether a federal agency action gives rise to prepara-
tion of an environmental impact statement. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (describing
purpose of impact statement includes "provid[ing] full and fair discussion of sig-
nificant environmental impacts"). Under NEPA regulations, major federal actions
are "new and continuing activities" that may have substantial environmental effects
and "are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility." 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.18. See also id. at § 1502.4 (listing types of activities falling within scope of
major federal actions necessitating impact statements).
For an action to invoke preparation of an impact statement, the activity must
be considered significant with respect to its context and its intensity. 40 C.F.R
§ 1508.27. This analysis initiates an examination of the action in the context of
"society as a whole.... the affected region, the affected interests, and the locality."
Id. at § 1508.27(a). The severity of the impact must also be examined. Id. at
§ 1508.27(b). This investigation should look at the magnitude of various impacts
on the designated area, surrounding areas, and other related issues. Id.
60. 566 F. Supp. 1472 (D.D.C. 1983).
61. Id. at 1474.
62. Id. at 1473. Responding to an apparent demand for additional nuclear
weapons material, the Department of Energy (DOE) began to reconstruct and up-
grade a nuclear reactor. Id. The reactor commenced operation in July of 1954. Id.
Fourteen years later, the reactor was shut down and placed on "stand-by status."
Id. at 1474. In October 1983, it was scheduled for the restart that triggered this
suit. Id.
63. Id. After conducting an environmental study, DOE indicated that the
restart would discharge high temperatures of water into a creek, thus, eliminating
about 1,000 acres of wetlands and destroying habitat for alligators, waterfowl, and
fish spawning. Id. at 1474-75. Further, the Department concluded that substantial
amounts of contaminants may penetrate into surface water systems, and the action
could generate up to 607,000 gallons of liquid waste annually. Id. at 1474.
64. Id. at 1475-76. DOE properly developed a study plan to assess anticipated
consequences of the reactor's operation on the environment. Id. at 1474. The
problem enunciated in this case arose when DOE determined that there would be
no significant impact resulting from the restart. Id. By reaching this conclusion,
DOE in essence, eliminated the possibility of an environmental impact statement,
and therefore, did not allow for comments from other federal agencies or from
the public before the action to restart the reactor became final. Id. at 1474-75. But
see Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983)
(restart of nuclear reactor does not require impact statement to address psycholog-
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Similarly, in National Org. for the Reform of Maijuana Laws v.
United States Dept. of State (NORML),65 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia applied NEPA's significant im-
pact test, and concluded that the United States' participation in a
Mexican herbicide spraying program required the preparation of
an impact statement.66 In NORML, the court found that the De-
partment of State was in "violation of NEPA for failing to prepare,
circulate for comment, and consider a detailed environmental im-
pact on the United States [regarding] effects of the spraying
program."67 The court concluded that the parquet used in the
spraying program contaminated the marijuana, and therefore,
posed a potential health hazard that triggered NEPA
considerations. 68
The Fourth Circuit adopted an alternative view of an impact
statement's purpose when it determined that a statement should be
prepared when the agency action could benefit the environment. 69
ical health issues not closely related to change in environment). For a discussion
of Metropolitan Edison, see infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
65. 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978).
66. Id. at 1233. NORML alleged that the Mexican herbicide spraying pro-
gram "presents a serious health hazard to the marijuana user," and therefore, re-
quires an impact statement. Id. at 1228. NORML further contended that
compliance with NEPA meant postponing participation in the spraying program
until the impact statement process was fulfilled. Id. at 1232. The Department of
State conceded to the NEPA claims and agreed to prepare an impact statement,
but did not intend to suspend the spraying program until the statement was com-
pleted. Id.
67. Id. at 1233. Although the district court found that the Department of
State violated NEPA and required preparation of an impact statement, it did not
grant an injunction to halt the spraying program. Id. at 1234. Balancing NEPA
goals against foreign policy and criminal status of marijuana use, the court found
an injunction was an unsatisfactory remedy. Id.
68. Id. at 1232. The court specifically recognized that the Department of
Health and Welfare felt it had a responsibility to warn citizens of the health effects
of the spraying program. Id.
69. Virginians For Dulles v. Volpe, 541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1976). See a/soJoel
A. Gallob, Article, In Search of Beneficial Environmental Impacts: Superconductive Mag-
netic Energy Storage, The National Envtronmental Policy Act and an Analysis of Environ-
mental Benefits, 14 HARv. ErL. L. Rv. 411 (1990). Typically environmental
impact statements focus on adverse effects on the environment, as opposed to
looking at the potential benefits of a federal action. Id. at 413. While evaluations
can reveal that changes would enhance the environment, the traditional approach
toward impact statements is to uncover environmental harms without attempting
to identify the possible benefits. Id. at 442. Regulations promulgated pursuant to
NEPA specifically denote considerations of both beneficial and detrimental effects
on the environment. Id. at 443-44. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8. Although both positive
and negative results should be evaluated, most courts do not give ample considera-
tion to environmental benefits. See, Gallob, supra at 444-50 (analyzing cases where
environmental benefits were recognized or addressed in impact statements).
1996]
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In Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe,70 various groups brought an action
against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) complaining of
noise disturbances and air pollution at Washington National Air-
port.7' The petitioners alleged that an impact statement would
show that changing the airport's hours of operation and directing
some traffic to Dulles International Airport would benefit the envi-
ronment.72 Relying on NEPA's legislative history, the Fourth Cir-
cuit concluded that the FAA activities were within the scope of
NEPA, and that an impact statement would reveal some environ-
mental benefits. 73 The court, therefore, ordered the FAA to pre-
pare an impact statement.74
2. When is an Environmental Impact Statement Not Necesary?
While the significant impact test is routinely applied to federal
agency actions, several courts have specified criteria for determin-
ing when an environmental impact statement is not necessary. 75 In
70. 541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1976).
71. Id. at 443. The Secretary of Transportation, the Director of Airport Serv-
ices, and eleven major airlines were also named as defendants. Id. The complaint
alleged that the noise and air pollution from airplanes were a nuisance, and that
the FAA violated NEPA by failing to file an impact statement regarding the opera-
tion of Washington National and Dulles International airports. Id.
72. Id. at 445. Three factors that exacerbated the nuisance problem were: (1)
an increase in the surrounding population; (2) an expansion of aircraft opera-
tions; and (3) a boost in the number of passengers. Id. Thus, the petitioners con-
tended that changing the two airports' operations could have immediate
beneficial environmental effects, and that these benefits would outweigh their
costs. Id.
73. Id. at 445-46. The court specifically relied upon a Senate Report that in-
cluded "expansion or revision of ongoing problems" as a major action affecting
the environment under NEPA Section 102(2) (C). Id. at 446. See S. REP. No. 296,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969). The court proceeded with a cost-benefit analysis
and acknowledged that the expense of completely abandoning the airport would
outweigh any environmental benefits. Volpe, 541 F.2d at 445. The petitioners did
not argue to dose the airport. Id. Rather, they contended that changing the oper-
ation hours and redirecting traffic would favor the environment. Id. The Fourth
Circuit found that the changed circumstances due to the increase in population
surrounding the airport, and the more frequent use of the airport, elicited an
evaluation of environmental concerns, and therefore, required an impact state-
ment. Id.
74. Volpe, 541 F.2d at 446-47. But see City of Irving, Tex. v. FAA, 539 F. Supp.
17, 27 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (finding impact statements are not required for temporary
tests on airport's runway).
75. See, e.g., Thomas v. Peterson, 589 F. Supp. 1139, 1145 (D. Idaho 1984)
(holding that Forest Service's decision to build road in forest without first prepar-
ing impact statement did not violate NEPA), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded
by, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985), and appeal after remand, 841 F.2d 332 (9th Cir.
1988); Sabine River Auth. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 679 (5th
Cir.) (finding non-development negative easement prohibiting change in status
quo did not require preparation of environmental impact statement), cert. denied,
18
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Merrell v. Thomas,76 the Ninth Circuit decided that EPA was not re-
quired to prepare an impact statement to register pesticides under
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).77
To reach its determination, the court focused upon the legislative
history of FIFRA. 78 In its evaluation, the Ninth Circuit recognized
that Congress could have drafted FIFRA to conform with NEPA, but
the legislature did not mandate this requirement.79 Accordingly,
FIFRA's amendments do not include a stipulation to prepare an
environmental impact statement.80 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
determined that, by declining to modify FIFRA, Congress impliedly
accepted the original version of the statute that excluded necessary
compliance with NEPA procedures.8' Moreover, the court found
that because FIFRA adequately protected environmental concerns,
FIFRA's provisions superseded NEPA procedures. 82 Ultimately, the
Ninth Circuit commented that applying NEPA to EPA actions
under FIFRA is inconsistent with congressional intent and would
"sabotage the delicate machinery that Congress designed to register
new pesticides."83
506 U.S. 823 (1992); National Ass'n of Prop. Owners v. United States, 499 F. Supp.
1223, 1263-64 (D. Minn. 1980) (concluding NEPA did not require Secretary of
Agriculture to prepare environmental impact statement before implementing
Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act (BWCAW) because two statutes con-
flicted with one another and BWCAW would prevail), aff'd sub. nom. State of Minn.
by Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), and cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007
(1982).
76. 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
77. Id. at 780-81.
78. Id. at 778-80.
79. Id. at 778. The court noted that Congress did not demonstrate that NEPA
should apply because the process it created in FIFRA allowed for environmental
considerations that "made NEPA superfluous." Id.
80. Id. The 1972 amendments to FIFRA did not modify the statute to require
impact statements for agency actions under the legislation. Id.
81. MerrelI 807 F.2d at 778-79. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that these "differ-
ences between FIFRA's registration procedure and NEPA's requirements indicate
that Congress did not intend that NEPA apply [to agency action under FIFRA]."
Id. at 778.
82. Id. The FIFRA registration process deviates from NEPA procedures.
FIFRA does not require the Administrator to publish the notice regarding all appli-
cations and, when notice under FIFRA is necessary, it does not require the same
information as an impact statement. Id. Although the processes under FIFRA and
NEPA were different, the court concluded that the FIFRA registration procedure
reflected a balance of "the environmental harm of using a pesticide against its
economic, social, and environmental benefits." Id. at 778-80. Thus, FIFRA ad-
dressed similar environmental concerns as NEPA. Id.
83. Id. at 779. The court stated that applying NEPA requirements to an
agency action under FIFRA would "increase a regulatory burden that Congress
intentionally lightened in 1978 and create new opportunities for litigation where
litigation was recently quelled." Id.
1996] 357
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The Sixth Circuit addressed a similar issue in Pacific Legal
Found. v. Andrus.84 The Foundation brought an action against the
Secretary of the Interior for violating NEPA by not filing an impact
statement before listing seven mussels as endangered species.85
Although the listings were considered "major federal actions," the
Sixth Circuit held that NEPA did not apply for four reasons.86 First,
the court concluded that filing an environmental impact statement
for an endangered species listing did not "serve the purpose of
[ESA]" because before promulgating a listing under ESA, the Sec-
retary must consider several factors that do not allow for NEPA con-
siderations. 87 Second, the court found that because ESA and NEPA
were in direct conflict with one another, ESA prevailed.88 Third,
the court deduced that ESA furthers the purposes of NEPA even
when no impact statement is filed because endangered species list-
ings "promote harmony between man and environment."89 Finally,
84. 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).
85. Id. at 831. This case arose in 1971, out of a contract for the construction
of two dams in the Duck River. Id. Once ESA was enacted, the Secretary of the
Interior listed mussels living in the river as endangered. Id. The builders had to
stop the construction of the dam because "the completion of the . . . project
would jeopardize the existence of two of the mussel species." Id.
86. Id. at 835.
87. Id. See ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1). Relying upon Supreme Court pre-
cedent in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
the Sixth Circuit found that NEPA was not designed to contradict an agency's en-
abling statute. Pacific Legal, 657 F.2d at 829 (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548
(1978)). Therefore, the circuit court concluded that ESA replaced NEPA. Id. at
836. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 548. (holding that
NEPA was not devised to "repeal by implication" any other statute).
88. Pacific Legal, 657 F.2d at 836. NEPA requires agencies to consider envi-
ronmental impacts. Id. Under ESA, the Secretary is limited to using scientific and
commercial data to determine an endangered species listing. Id. Therefore, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that since the "statutory mandate of ESA prevents the Sec-
retary from considering the environmental impact when listing a[n endangered
species]," NEPA is inapplicable. Id.
89. Id. at 837. The Sixth Circuit compared the obligations of federal agencies
under NEPA to the Secretary's duties under ESA and stated that, under ESA, fed-
eral agencies have a duty to:
serve as trustees of the environment for the next generation; to as-
sure a safe, healthful, productive environment; to attain the widest range
of beneficial uses without degradation of risk to health or safety; to pre-
serve natural aspects of our national heritage; to achieve a balance be-
tween population and resource use; and to enhance the quality of
renewable resources and recycle depletable resources.
Id. (citing NEPA § 101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)).
Under ESA, the Secretary must attempt to conserve the environment by "pre-
vent[ing] the irretrievable loss of a natural resource." Id. Therefore, in the endan-
gered species listing process, the Secretary acts as a "trustee of the environment" by
preserving the environment and protecting species. Id.
20
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the court concluded that the respective legislative history of ESA
and NEPA confirmed congressional intent that an impact state-
ment was not required for an endangered species listing.90
NEPA impact statements are also not required when an
agency's enabling statute imposes either time restraints or a need
for immediate action on the federal agency.9' In Flint Ridge Dev. Co.
v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n,9 2 the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment (HUD) must devise an environmental impact statement
before allowing a disclosure statement filed under the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act) to become effec-
tive. 93 The Disclosure Act requires HUD to respond to a diclosure
statement within 30 days. 94 A well drafted environmental impact
statement can take over three months to complete. 95 Since the
preparation time of the impact statement created a "clear and fun-
damental conflict" with HUD's mandatory duties under the Disclo-
sure Act, HUD was not required to draft the document.96
90. Id. at 838-39. The Sixth Circuit first recognized that neither NEPA nor its
requirements were mentioned in ESA. Id. at 838-39 & 839 n.12. The court further
noted that in process of implementing the 1978 amendments to ESA witnesses
testified at the congressional hearings and contended that endangered species list-
ings should be conditional upon impact statement preparation. Id. at 839. None-
theless, Congress never enacted this request as a statutory provision. Id. Viewing
legislative history of NEPA and ESA as a whole, the Sixth Circuit found that "Con-
gress did not intend to require the Secretary to file an environmental impact state-
ment before listing a species as endangered or threatened under ESA." Id. at 840.
91. See generally Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 512 F.2d 1332, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding time restraints under in-
terim curtailment plan can make it impossible to prepare impact statements);
American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 494 F.2d 925, 948
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 921 (1974) (finding interim curtailment plan does
not allow for "full exploration of environmental problems prior to implementation
of that plan"); Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Dept. of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 108 (3d Cir.
1973) (granting exemption from NEPA for OSHA to create temporary emergency
standard); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 367
F. Supp. 122, 125-26 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (preparing overall statement for program
as opposed to individual statements for each action within program fulfills NEPA
requirements), aff'd, 502 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1974).
92. 426 U.S. 776, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976).
93. Id. at 778.
94. Id. at 781. Under the Disclosure Act, a statement of record automatically
becomes effective 30 days after the filing unless HUD suspends it for inadequate
disclosure during that time. Id.
95. Id. at 788-89 & 789 n.10. An impact statement must be "drafted, circu-
lated, commented upon, and then reviewed and revised in light of the comments."
Id. at 789. Typically, the text of final drafts of impact statements ranges from 150-
300 pages. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.7.
96. Flint Ridge, 426 U.S. at 791. The Court stated that the Disclosure Act man-
dates HUD to act within the 30 day period; therefore, it does not allow suspension
of that deadline to prepare an impact statement. Id. at 789-90. Proper timing is a
1996] 359
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The preparation of environmental impact statements is further
restricted because NEPA only applies to actions that will potentially
affect the physical environment. 97 In Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Peo-
ple Against Nuclear Energy,98 the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission satisfied
NEPA terms when it decided whether to allow a nuclear power
plant to resume operation. 99 Adopting a narrow interpretation of
section 102(C) of NEPA, the Court found that this language limits
NEPA's application to agency actions that impact the physical envi-
ronment.'00 To reach this determination the Court relied on the
statute's language and its pertinent legislative history which demon-
strated that NEPA was designed to address land, water, and air envi-
ronments. 10 1 Moreover, the Court found that NEPA is triggered
when there is a "reasonably close causal relationship between a
change in the physical environment and the effect at issue."10 2 The
principal focus in NEPA. Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 718 (9th
Cir. 1988). An environmental impact statement is only effective if it is prepared
with enough time to allow contribution "to the decisionmaking process and will
not be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made." Id. (citations omit-
ted). See also Amoco Oil Co v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (finding
that "extraordinary expeditious decision-making" is factor to exempt agencies
from completing impact statements).
97. See Sabine River Auth. v. United States Dept. of Interior, 951 F.2d 669 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 823 (1992); National Ass'n of Prop. Owners v. United
States, 499 F. Supp. 1223, 1265 (D. Minn. 1980) (stating environmental impact
statements are not necessary "to leave nature alone").
98. 460 U.S. 766 (1983).
99. Id. at 768. The petitioners, Metropolitan Edison Company, owned two
nuclear reactors that were licensed for operation after the company prepared envi-
ronmental impact statements. Id. After operating for some time, one reactor was
shut down and the other suffered damage resulting from an accident. Id. When
one of the reactors was scheduled for restart, Metropolitan Edison Company in-
vited comments from interested parties regarding the reactor's restoration. Id. at
769. People Against Nuclear Energy commented that the nuclear reactor's opera-
tion "would cause both severe psychological health damage to persons living in the
vicinity, and serious damage to the stability, cohesiveness, and well-being of the
neighboring communities." Id.
100. Id. at 772. While the parties acknowledged that psychological health ef-
fects may be cognizable under NEPA, the Supreme Court recognized that an
agency action triggers the terms set forth in NEPA when the "relationship between
the change in the environment and the 'effect' at issue" is not too remote. Id.
Further, the Court stated that NEPA "does not require the agency to assess every
impact or effect of its proposed action, but only the impact or effect on the envi-
ronment." Id.
101. Id. at 773. The Court accepted a confined interpretation of environ-
ment and concluded that when Congress enacted NEPA it was "talking about the
physical environment." Id. at 772. See H.R. REP. No. 378, supra note 1, at 3, re-
printed in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2753 (providing background and purpose of NEPA
legislation).
102. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 774. The Court found that a harm "too
remote" from the physical environment does not justify an assessment. Id. There-
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Supreme Court ultimately ruled that NEPA only requires considera-
tions of the direct effects of present physical actions and the ramifi-
cations of possible future outcomes on the environment.1 03
Courts have also developed the functional equivalence doc-
trine as an exception to NEPA. 104 In Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA,10 5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled
that an impact statement was not necessary to establish fuel regula-
tions under the Clean Air Act (CAA).106 The court concluded that
EPA actions under CAA operated as a "functional equivalent" to
NEPA because CAA procedures allow for a systematic evaluation of
various environmental factors. 107 The circuit court noted that envi-
ronmental issues are considered in the general application of CAA,
and further, that "the Act's rule-making procedures 'strike a worka-
ble balance between some of the advantages and disadvantages of
full application of NEPA.' "108
fore, if the harm does not have a relatively close correlation to the physical envi-
ronment, NEPA does not apply. Id. at 778.
103. Id. at 779. The Court noted that NEPA was enacted to "assess the future
effects of future actions," and therefore, the statute does not "create a remedial
scheme" to assess previous federal actions. Id. Accordingly, NEPA's scope should
not be implicated " 'in the wake of' any kind of accident." Id.
104. See Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 286 (E.D.N.C.
1981) The functional equivalence test is based upon the premise that NEPA
should not be read inconsistently with other statutes that address environmental
concerns. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 662
(D.D.C. 1978). See, e.g., Sandra P. Montrose, Comment, To Police the Police: Func-
tional Equivalence to the EIS Requirement and EPA Remedial Actions Under Superfund, 33
CATH. U. L. REv. 863, 874-87 (1984) (discussing functional equivalence standard
for compliance with NEPA). For a further discussion of the functional equivalence
test, see infra notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
105. 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
106. Id. at 749. The court saw no need to require an impact statement from
an agency that deals directly with environmental protection issues as part of its
general duties. Id.
107. Id. at 749-50. One author has recognized that while courts generally ap-
ply the functional equivalence test to EPA actions, there is no bright line rule
describing the precise components of "equivalence." Montrose, supra note 104, at
875. The general consensus reached by courts is that "substantial compliance by
EPA with NEPA's requirements is an effective substitute for preparation of an [im-
pact statement]." Id.
108. Amoco Oi 501 F.2d at 750 (citation omitted). Section 111 of CAA is a
proper substitute for impact statements because it generates the same environmen-
tal inquiries as NEPA. Montrose, supra note 104, at 876. Particularly, the statute,
provides ample opportunity for public comment with respect to EPA actions. Id.
In fact, Montrose states that approximately 200 interested parties responded to
EPA procedures used to specify emissions standards under CAA. Id.
1996]
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Douglas County II, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district
court's decision to grant summary judgment against the Secretary
of the Interior for violating NEPA by failing to complete an envi-
ronmental impact statement.10 9 The Douglas County II court con-
cluded that NEPA does not apply to critical habitat designations
under ESA. 10
The court began its analysis of NEPA by reviewing both the
plain language and the legislative history of the statute.111 To de-
termine whether NEPA was applicable, the court specifically ad-
dressed the meaning of the phrase "to the fullest extent possible" in
section 102(2)(C).112 The Ninth Circuit recognized that courts
have construed this phrase to place a general duty on federal agen-
cies to follow NEPA procedures except when compliance with
NEPA is unreasonable under the agency's enabling statute.' 13 Fur-
ther, Congress recognized that an agency's enabling statute should
prevail when that statute either directly conflicts with, or expressly
prohibits compliance with NEPA procedures.' 4 However, in NEPA
legislative history, Congress indicated that while the "to the fullest
109. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1497.
110. Id. at 1507-08.
111. Id. at 1501.
112. Id. NEPA § 102(2)(C) requires that "to the fulest extent possible (2) all
agencies of the federal government shall- (c) include in... major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed [environ-
mental impact] statement." NEPA § 102(2) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (C) (emphasis
added).
113. Id. The Supreme Court clarified this proposition in two cases. In Flint
Ridge, a 1976 decision, the Court found that this language was "neither accidental
nor hyperbolic [instead] . . . the phrase is a deliberate command that the duty
NEPA imposes upon the agencies to consider environmental factors not be
shunted aside in the bureaucratic shuffle." Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers
Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976). Two years later in Vermont
Yankee, the Supreme Court stated that "where a clear and unavoidable conflict in
statutory authority exists, NEPA must give way" because NEPA was not intended to
repeal by implication any other statute. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978). The Douglas
County II court found that even though Flint Ridge dealt with time constraints and
Douglas County II did not, NEPA was still inapplicable to the case at hand. Douglas
County II, 48 F.3d at 1502.
114. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1502 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, supra
note 7, at 9-10, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2770). In House Conference Re-
port 765, the conferees noted that the purpose of the "to the fullest extent possi-
ble" language is to clarify a federal agency's duty to comply with NEPA unless an
agency's existing law "expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the
directives impossible." Id. (quoting H.R. CON. REP. No. 765, supra note 7, at 9-10
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.CA.N. at 2770). For a further discussion of circumstances
when an environmental impact statement is not necessary, see supra notes 75-108
and accompanying text.
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extent possible" language in section 102 of NEPA can allow for
NEPA exemptions under certain circumstances, attempts by federal
agencies to escape NEPA requirements based upon this language
should rarely occur.1 1 5
In Douglas County II, the Ninth Circuit followed its analysis pre-
viously set forth in.MerrelL116 Thus, the Douglas County !/court com-
pared NEPA procedures to ESA procedures, and concluded that
ESA effectively supersedes NEPA." 7 To reach this determination
the Ninth Circuit liberally construed congressional intent.'l 8 Since
the Secretary's conduct under ESA conforms to NEPA demands,
the Douglas County II court found that ESA's "carefully crafted con-
gressional mandate for public participation," used when designat-
ing critical habitats, successfully displaces NEPA's procedural and
informational requirements.' 19
115. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 765, supra note 7, at 9-10 reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.CA.N. at 2770. Congress specifically stated that the provision shall not be
used "as a means of avoiding directives set out in section 102." Id. at 10, reprinted in
U.S.C.CA.N. at 2770. Further, the language is intended to assure that "all agen-
cies ... shall comply with the directives" in section 102 and "no agency shall utilize
an excessively narrow construction of its existing authorizations to avoid compli-
ance." Id. (emphasis added).
116. Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987). For a discusson of Merrel4 see supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
117. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1503. The court based its analysis on a simi-
lar situation where EPA was not required to prepare an environmental impact
statement to register pesticides under FIFRA. Id. See Merrell, 807 F.2d at 779.
118. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1504. Specifically the Ninth Circuit looked
to the 1978 amendments of the ESA regarding critical habitat designations. See
ESA § 4, as amended by Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 1533. The main purpose of these
amendments was to improve the listing and notice processes. H.R. REP. No. 1625,
supra note 7, at 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. at 9464. In this report, Congress
found that the "extensive notice provisions" will insure that the Secretary is not
"designating critical habitat without consulting the views of the people of the af-
fected area." Id. at 16, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. at 9466.
The court noted that, in 1983, the Secretary reported his decision not to com-
ply with NEPA impact statement requirement. Id. In ESA's 1988 amendments,
Congress did not respond to this interpretation of § 1533. Id. at 1504. Based upon
Supreme Court precedent, "[w] hen Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a long-
standing administrative interpretation without pertinent change, the 'congres-
sional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive evidence
that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.'" Id. (quoting Commod-
ity Future Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986) (citations omit-
ted)). Through its inaction, Congress implicitly accepted the Secretary's
interpretation not to prepare an environmental assessment and an environmental
impact statement for critical habitat designations. Id. This contention is particu-
larly relevant in Douglas County II because, in ESA amendments, Congress ad-
dressed other parts of § 1533 but it did not change the critical habitat designation
process. Id.
119. Douglas County I 48 F.3d at 1503. "[T]hrough debate and compromise"
Congress developed an explicit process "for the Secretary to follow when address-
1996]
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In addition, the Ninth Circuit found that ESA is distinguish-
able from NEPA.12° The court noted that while NEPA provides the
opportunity to evaluate environmental concerns, ESA's critical
habitat designation process places specific mandates on the Secre-
tary. 12 ' The court particularly addressed section 4 of ESA which
provides that the Secretary "must designate any area without which
the species would become extinct."1 22 The Ninth Circuit found
that this requirement directly conflicted with NEPA because,
under certain circumstances, the Secretary has "no discretion to
consider the environmental impact of his or her actions" when
designating critical habitats.123
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit relied on Metropolitan Edison
Co.12 4 to conclude that even if Congress intended for NEPA to ap-
ply to ESA, an impact statement was not required in this case be-
cause the critical habitat designation did not "alter the natural
untouched physical environment."' 25 This view is derived from the
purpose of NEPA "to provide a mechanism to enhance or improve
the environment and prevent further irreparable damage."1 26 A
ing the needs of endangered species." Id. In effect ESA's detailed critical habitat
procedures reach the same result as NEPA procedures. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. The Secretary "may exclude from the critical habitat any area, the
exclusion of which, would be more beneficial than harmful ..." Id. The designa-
tion must, however, include necessary habitat for species survival. Id. See ESA
§ 4(b)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b) (2).
122. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1503 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)) (em-
phasis added). Under this section the Secretary does not have discretion when
designating critical habitats. Id. Congress set forth limits on the Secretary to only
consider environmental components directly related to species' conservation. Id.
Consequently, under NEPA, in cases where extinction is at issue, the Secretary
cannot take part in a broad environmental analysis when designating critical habi-
tats. Id.
123. Id. Before establishing a critical habitat designation under § 4 of ESA,
the Secretary must: (1) "publish a general notice and the complete text of the
proposed regulation in the Federal Register," and "give actual notice" to state or
foreign agencies and counties that may be affected to allow comments on the pro-
posed action; (2) notify appropriate "professional scientific organizations;" (3)
provide general public notice by publishing a summary of the proposed determi-
nation in a widely circulated newspaper; and (4) "promptly hold one public hear-
ing on the proposed regulation if any person files a request for such a hearing
within 45 days after the date of publication of general notice." ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(5) (A).
124. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766
(1983).
125. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1505. For a discussion of Metropolitan Edison,
see supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
126. Id. (quoting Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir.
1981)). Generally, NEPA purports to state a national policy in order to "en-
courage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment."
26
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critical habitat designation sets aside land as an endangered species
living area.12 7 Such designations do not alter physical conditions,
instead, they conserve the environment. 2 8 Therefore, an environ-
mental impact statement is not necessary because the outcome of
critical habitat designations essentially keeps the environment in its
present state. 129 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Pacific Legal 657 F.2d at 837 (citations omitted). Hence, the Ninth Circuit devel-
oped a general rule regarding the preparation of an impact statement:
[i]f the purpose of NEPA is to protect the physical environment, and the
purpose of preparing an EIS is to alert agencies and the public to poten-
tial adverse consequences to the land, sea or air, then an EIS is unneces-
sary when the action at issue does not alter the natural, untouched
physical environment at all.
Douglas County , 48 F.3d at 1505 (emphasis in original). See also Sabine River Auth.
v. United States Dept. of Interior, 951 F.2d 669 (5th Cir.) (finding that impact
statements are not required for actions maintaining environment conditions), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 823 (1992). For a further discussion of Sabine River Auth., see infra
note 129.
127. ESA § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5). Critical habitat designations have mistak-
enly been viewed as physical alterations. Salzman, supra note 23, at 336. Conse-
quently, the choosing of a critical habitat designation has been perceived as a
political process. Id. This contention is supported by the 1978 House debate
where the Fish and Wildlife Service argued that:
[Ti he designation of [c]ritical [h]abitat does not have any direct impact
upon the environment. The designation of [ciritical [h]abitat, in and of
itself, prevents nothing, stops nothing, discourages nothing, and controls
nothing. It simply designates an area that is necessary to the continued
existence and possibly to the recovery of an [e]ndangered or
[t]hreatened species. It is a biological designation.
Id. at 336 & n.104 (citing Endangered Species Authorization: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the Comm. on
Merchant and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1155 (1978)).
128. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1505. Under Metropolitan Edison, "NEPA
does not require the agency to assess every impact or effect of its proposed action,
but only the impact or effect on the environment." Metropolitan Edison Co. v.
People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 772 (1983) (emphasis in original).
129. Douglas County I, 48 F.3d at 1505. One court has declared that an envi-
ronmental impact statement is not needed "in order to leave nature alone." Na-
tional Ass'n of Property Owners v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1223, 1265 (D.
Minn. 1980), aff'd sub nom., Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
In Sabine River Auth., 951 F.2d at 679, the petitioners appealed the district
court's decision dismissing their claims that the Fish and Wildlife Service violated
NEPA when it did not prepare an impact statement when it gained possession of a
non-developmental easement essential to waterfowl survival. Id. at 679. Prior to
accepting the easement, the Fish and Wildlife Service prepared an environment
assessment and made a finding of no significant impact. Id. The Fifth Circuit
found that the Fish and Wildlife Service action was consistent with NEPA because
its acceptance of the easement "[did] not cause any change in the physical envi-
ronment." Id. Since the purpose of the easement was to foreclose any alterations
in the physical environment of the wedand area and NEPA does not require prepa-
ration of an impact statement "to leave nature alone," the Fish and Wildlife deci-
sion not to prepare the statement was correct. Id. (citations omitted). See also
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Epsy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1343-44 (9th Cir. 1995); Burbank v.
Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt, 623 F.2d 115, 116 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
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ESA "furthers the goals of NEPA without demanding an [impact
statement]."130 The court specifically noticed that both NEPA and
ESA serve the same purpose to promote human welfare while en-
hancing the environment.131 Ultimately, the Douglas County Hcourt
concluded that, in accordance with NEPA goals, the Secretary pre-
serves the environment during critical habitat designations. 132
V. CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
A. The Ninth Circuit Properly Created an Exemption from
NEPA for Critical Habitat Designations
Traditionally, the Ninth Circuit has attributed a broad mean-
ing to NEPA by "mak[ing] as liberal an interpretation as [possible]
S. . to accommodate the application of [the statute]."133 However,
the facts of Douglas County II present an appropriate situation for
the Ninth Circuit to create an exemption from NEPA for critical
habitat designations. This conclusion is based on two reasons.
First, under NEPA, a federal agency has the responsibility of mak-
ing the threshold decision of whether an environmental impact
statement is necessary for a proposed action.1 3 4 Consequently, the
450 U.S. 965 (1981) (stating environmental impact statements are not needed
"when... proposed action will effect no change in the status quo"); Upper Snake
River v. Hodel, 921 F.2d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting environmental impact
statements "need not discuss the environmental effects of continuing to use land
in the manner in which it is presently being used").
130. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1506-07.
131. Id. at 1506. NEPA is "a mechanism to enhance or improve the environ-
ment and prevent further irreparable damage." Id. (citations omitted). Similarly,
ESA was designed to "halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost." Id. (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184
(1978)). The Ninth Circuit concluded that "[a]s with the decision to list a species
under ESA, the decision to preserve critical habitat for a species protects the envi-
ronment from exactly the kind of human impacts that NEPA is designed to fore-
close." Id. at 1507.
132. Id. at 1506. By designating critical habitats, the Secretary is "working to
preserve the environment and prevent the irretrievable loss of a natural resource."
Id. (citation omitted).
133. Bart Brush, 1991 Ninth Circuit Environmental Review National Environmen-
tal Policy Act, 22 ENvrL. L. 1163, 1164 (1992) (citations omitted). While NEPA
provides an avenue for agencies to collect information about the possible environ-
mental effects of a proposed action, "the ultimate choice as to how and whether to
proceed is left up to agency discretion, so long as the agency complies with the
NEPA process." Id. at 1167.
134. Peshlakai v. Duncan, 476 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (D.D.C. 1979). See also
Metlaktla Indian Community v. Adams, 427 F. Supp. 871, 874 (D.D.C. 1974);
Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 645 (2d Cir. 1972). The role of the reviewing
court is to determine "that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental
consequences" and reasonably conclude that there will not be an eminent effect
on the environment. Peshlakai, 476 F. Supp. at 1252. (citations omitted). See also
Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir, 1988). If the agency has
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plaintiff has the burden of showing that a determination not to pre-
pare an impact statement violated NEPA.135 In Douglas County II,
the County did not meet that burden.13 6
Second, although NEPA contains language that requires fed-
eral agencies to strictly adhere to the statute's provisions, courts
have declined to subject some agency actions to NEPA require-
ments. 137 In Douglas County II, the Ninth Circuit carved out another
exemption from NEPA's general rule of applicability by holding
that this legislation does not apply to critical habitat designa-
tions. 13 8 Nonetheless, this exception is narrow.139 The limitation
of the Ninth Circuit's decision is evidenced by the fact that the
court declined to address any other provisions of ESA in its analy-
sis.140 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's decision is not all inclusive
because it does not apply to every action initiated by the Depart-
ment of the Interior.1 41 Further, when observing the congressional
purpose behind critical habitat designations, it becomes clear that
followed this rule, the agency's determination may be overturned only if it is arbi-
trary and capricious. Id.
135. Peshlakai, 476 F. Supp. at 1252. See also Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43,
52 (5th Cir. 1974); Hiram Clarke Civics Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 426 (5th
Cir. 1973). A plaintiff's burden is met by showing that an action may have a signif-
icant effect on the environment. Peshlakai, 476 F. Supp. at 1252. This burden does
not require a demonstration that the action will "necessarily affect the human envi-
ronment to a significant extent." Id. If the plaintiff successfully meets this stan-
dard, the burden shifts to the government "to demonstrate that any environmental
impacts are not significant." Id. (citations omitted).
136. See Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1507. Referring to the Sixth Circuit's
analysis in Pacific Legal, the Douglas County I1 court reached the final conclusion
that an impact statement was not necessary. Id.
137. See NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332; Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 779
(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (declining to require impact state-
ment for EPA action under FIFRA). The decision to limit NEPA's reach is sup-
ported by NEPA conferees who stated that NEPA is applicable unless "the existing
law applicable to such agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes full com-
liance with one of the directives impossible." H.R CONF. REP. No. 765, supra note
,at 9-10, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2770.
138. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1502. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning on this issue, see supra notes 109-32 and accompanying text.
139. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1507. This rule specifically addresses critical
habitat designations. The Ninth Circuit did not embrace a rule generally applica-
ble either to ESA or to the Department of the Interior. Id.
140. Douglas County , 48 F.3d at 1501. The court noted that the issue of
NEPA applicability to critical habitat designations was one of "first impression." Id.
Further, although the court relied on the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Pacific Legal
Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981), which held that the Secretary need
not consider the environmental impact when listing an endangered species, the
Ninth Circuit in Douglas County II did not delineate a similar rule for endangered
species listings. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1506-07. For a further discussion of
Pacific Legal, see supra notes 83-89.
141. Id. at 1507.
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Congress instilled duties in the Secretary of the Interior that specifi-
cally apply to section 4 of ESA.142
B. The Functional Equivalence Test as an Alternative Analysis
The functional equivalence test is a judicial doctrine that rec-
ognizes that "where a federal agency is engaged primarily in an ex-
amination of environmental questions, and where substantive and
procedural standards ensure full and adequate consideration of en-
vironmental issues, then formal compliance with NEPA is not nec-
essary, [and] functional compliance [is] sufficient." 143  The
functional equivalence test was initially justified by allowing EPA
discretion in preparing impact statements because the agency's
"sole purpose is protection of the environment."144 The applica-
tion of this test is premised upon the extent of the agency's involve-
ment in environmental issues.' 45 Accordingly, the test has been
successfully applied to EPA. 146
142. See ESA §§ 3-4, 7, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532-33, 36.
143. Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp 276, 286 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
To be effective, the functionally equivalent process must show that the five core
issues of NEPA were observed. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Blum, 458 F.
Supp. 650, 661 (D.D.C. 1978). The issues are "the environmental impact of the
action, possible adverse environmental effects, possible alternatives, the relation-
ship between long-[term] and short-term uses and goals and any irreversible com-
mitments of resources .. " Id. (quoting Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
144. Geneslaw, supra note 4, at 136. For a list of cases applying the functional
equivalence test to EPA actions, see supra note 6.
145. Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 287 (citing Environmental Defense Fund v.
Blum, 458 F. Supp. at 661 n.5). The functional equivalence test was not designed
to develop a broad exemption for all environmental agencies, instead, it protects
those processes that fulfill the goals of NEPA. Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,
489 F.2d at 1257.
146. See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The func-
tional equivalence doctrine originally recognized that a federal agency may inher-
ently conform to NEPA. Geneslaw, supra note 4, at 128. Essentially, this doctrine
allows EPA to avoid preparing an impact statement under NEPA as long as it con-
sidered elements essential to NEPA's environmental preservation principles. Id.
Accordingly, courts have concluded that if the functional equivalence test is to
have any effect, EPA should not have to follow NEPA procedures. Environmental
Defense Fund v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. at 662 n.6.
Subsequently, courts have found that a statute can provide a functionally
equivalent process to NEPA. Amoco Oil, 501 F.2d at 750. For instance, courts have
recognized that the Clean Air Act, "provides for [an] orderly consideration of di-
verse environmental factors." Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 834
(6th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). The application of the functional equivalence
test has been justified upon the principal that it is unnecessary to demand an im-
pact statement from an agency whose decision to proceed with an action is "in-
fused with ... environmental considerations" in its administrative statute. Amoco
Oil, 501 F.2d at 749-50. Indeed, to require an environmental impact statement
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While the functional equivalence test has been primarily ap-
plied to EPA actions, this concept can effectively be extended to
other federal agencies that are authorized to analyze environmental
impacts.1 47 Thus, the Ninth Circuit could have applied the func-
tional equivalence test in Douglas County I.148 Generally, an
agency's administrative statute meets the functional equivalence
test "[when it shows that] the agency... (1) balanced environmen-
tal costs and benefits; (2) fairly provided for public participation at
a meaningful time in the decision making process; and (3) consid-
ered any substantive comments elicited."149 To effectively imple-
ment this doctrine the court would have had to find that critical
habitat designations under ESA conform to the same criteria as
NEPA. 150
and a "decision setting forth the same considerations" would be redundant and
unnecessary. Id.
147. Warren County, 528 F. Supp at 287. The application of the functional
equivalence doctrine is based upon the concept that it is unnecessary to complete
an impact statement under NEPA when there is an "equivalent action through
consideration of environmental concerns under the [other] statutes." Id. More-
over, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized
that requiring an impact statement in addition to an agency decision that makes
the same environmental evaluations "would be legalism carried to the extreme."
Amoco Oil Co., 501 F.2d at 750.
148. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1504. Although the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized that the functional equivalence test is being used by other courts, because
the parties did not raise it as an argument, the court declined to address it. Id. at
1504 n.10.
149. Montrose, supra note 104, at 882. Montrose describes the functional
equivalence test as a two-tiered analysis. Id. at 869. "First, the court considers the
urgency of the situation the agency is addressing, and the extent to which its en-
abling statute and the accompanying regulations . . . require consideration of
NEPA's core concerns." Id. Next, the court looks to the facts of the case to discern
whether "there was sufficient opportunity for the public and affected parties to
comment, and whether that information was considered by the agency." Id. See
also Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
150. Id. at 1504. A functional equivalent argument contends that "one pro-
cess requires the same steps as another." Id. at 1504 n.10. This theory is distin-
guishable from a displacement argument that would assert that "Congress
intended to displace one procedure with another." Id. In Douglas County II, the
general contention of functional equivalence would be that a critical habitat
designation under ESA, by itself, provides sufficient consideration of environmen-
tal factors. See id.
In Pacific Legal, the Sixth Circuit suggested that a critical habitat designation
may be the functional equivalent of an impact statement under NEPA. Pacific
Legal, 657 F.2d at 835. The court reached this conclusion even though it found
that listing endangered species under ESA did not meet the functional equiva-
lence test. Id. The court found that after the 1978 amendments to ESA, critical
habitat designations fulfilled NEPA criteria by requiring the Secretary to evaluate
the economic effects of his action and to publish all issues and concerns raised by
the designation. Id. By providing these evaluations and notifications, the Secre-
tary fundamentally accomplishes NEPA's goals. Id. For a further discussion of Pa-
cific Legal, see supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
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Critical habitat designations under ESA provide appropriate
environmental considerations to fulfill functional equivalence re-
quirements.1 51 Before designating a critical habitat, ESA requires
the Secretary to publish the content of the designation in the Fed-
eral Register, to give adequate notice of the action to all interested
parties, and to explore the relevant consequences and altematives
to this action.1 52 Furthermore, the Secretary must provide an op-
portunity for comment on the action.153
Under NEPA, federal agencies must detail the environmental
effects of their actions and "consult with and obtain comments"
from other agencies. 154 Although NEPA requires more precise in-
formation regarding environmental effects than ESA, it is clear that
when completing critical habitat designations, the Secretary will
consider the positive impacts the designation will have on the en-
dangered species, and the consequences it will have on others af-
fected by the designation. 155 Here, the functional equivalence test
could have been applied because the statutes' processes are similar
and the overall objectives of NEPA are achieved when ESA require-
ments are followed. 156 Hence, NEPA and ESA share a common
goal. Moreover, the application of the functional equivalence doc-
151. See ESA § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b); 50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (1994) (stating
impact analysis of critical habitat).
152. See ESA § 4, 16 U.S.C. § 1533. See also Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1503.
The Douglas County II court referred to its analysis in Merrell and stated that the
procedure that Congress chose for the Secretary to follow when designating a criti-
cal habitat made NEPA "superfluous." Id. See also Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776,
778 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). For a discussion of Merrell,
see supra notes 76-83 and accompanying test.
153. See ESA § 4(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(5). The Douglas County IIcourt looked
specifically at critical habitat designation under ESA, and noted that "[t]his care-
fully crafted congressional mandate for public participation in the designation
process, like the FIFRA procedures reviewed in Merre, displaces NEPA's proce-
dural and informational requirements." Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1503.
154. NEPA § 102(C) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2).
155. See Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1504. The 1978 amendments to ESA
require actual notice of the critical habitat to affected local communities. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1804, supra note 47, at 27, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9494.
Therefore, these amendments allow for adequate communication and feedback
between the Secretary and the public. Id. This aspect of the critical habitat
designation process parallels NEPA objectives. See Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at
1504; NEPA § 102(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
156. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1257 (D.C. Cir.
1973). Moreover, the functional equivalence test does not mandate that the
agency "go through all the motions [in creating] an impact statement," it simply
requires that an agency have a substantive and procedural process to fulfill the
goals of NEPA. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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trine eliminates the expenditure of unnecessary time and energy
into two procedures that will eventually reach the same result. 15 7
VI. IMPACT
Douglas County II stands for the principle that strict adherence
to NEPA procedures is not necessary when an agency's administra-
tive statute provides for ample consideration of environmental ef-
fects. 5 8 Courts have recognized this proposition, noting that NEPA
was "clearly designed to assure consideration of environmental mat-
ters by all agencies in their planning and decision making- [sic]
especially those agencies who now have little or no legislative au-
thority to take environmental considerations into account."' 59 The
question then arises of whether NEPA serves a useful purpose when
an agency has parallel environmental recognition requirements. 160
In cases where the agency's implementing legislation provides for
consideration of environmental concerns, NEPA's application is
not practical. 16' Preparing impact statements under NEPA can
157. Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 287 (E.D.N.C.
1981). Courts do not apply this test to disregard NEPA, but to avoid unnecessary
repetition of applications regarding environmental impacts. Id.
158. See Douglas County I, 48 F.3d at 1507. Although NEPA does not apply in
all instances, it is clear that the statute plays an essential role in environmental
conservation. Hartmann, supra note 42, at 744. Without this broad legislative
overlay, federal agencies would have a lower responsibility for environmental dete-
rioration caused by government actions. Id.
159. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 381 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), appeal after remand, 513 F.2d 506 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1025 (1975), and reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 1092 (1976). A
Senate committee report further detailed that "agencies having authority in the
environmental improvement field will continue to operate under their legislative
mandates as previously established, and that those legislative mandates are not
changed in any way by [NEPA]." Id. (citing "Major Changes in S. 1075" as passed
by the Senate, 115 CONG. REc. 40417, 40423 (1969)).
160. Riechel, supra note 55, at 116. NEPA has been "a successful vehicle"
used to influence government participation in environmental preservation. Id.
Although NEPA's basic concept for environmental protection is admirable, a ma-
jor complaint of the statute is that it is strictly procedural and does not place sub-
stantive requirements on federal agencies. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). One commentator identified NEPA as a
"checklist that federal agencies must glance at before making significant deci-
sions." Hartmann, supra note 42, at 720. NEPA guarantees that the government
will evaluate environmental effects as a component of its operations; but, the legis-
lation does not direct agencies to reach a particular conclusion. Brush, supra note
135, at 1165. Consequently, an agency's administrative statute may place more
substantive requirements and enforcement mechanisms regarding an agency ac-
tion to satisfy NEPA and proceed beyond NEPA's reach. Hartmann, supra note 42,
at 720.
161. Brush, supra note 135, at 1167. While compliance with NEPA is neces-
sary for certain endeavors, strict compliance to the statute may not be an appropri-
ate test. See id. NEPA should be approached liberally when applying it to actions
1996]
33
Payne: Critically Acclaimed but Not Critically Followed - The Inapplicab
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
372 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. VII: p. 339
cause substantial delays for many federal projects when an agency
has already observed environmental issues.' 62 This dilemma may
lead federal agencies to either ignore terms under NEPA or refrain
from initiating numerous federal projects. 163 While this hesitation
can cause federal agencies to abandon environmentally controver-
sial projects or modify actions that may have severe environmental
impacts, it may also deter the government from considering certain
actions solely to avoid possible NEPA litigation. 64 Therefore, when
an agency follows an administrative statute that provides ample
NEPA compliance, a strict application of NEPA is unnecessary. 65
A consistent, yet narrow, procedure for federal agencies to con-
sider and for courts to follow in the environmental context is the
functional equivalence test.166 This test is an appropriate substitute
giving little or no attention to environmental repercussions. Id. at 1164. In in-
stances where a statute requires federal agencies to address environmental issues
before an action is commenced, discretion should be given to an agency and its
administrative statute, as long as that enabling legislation generally complies with
NEPA procedures. Id. See also Riechel, supra note 55, at 120 (acknowledging that
federal agencies "[can skew] scientific data in the EIS to meet their political
agendas").
162. Riechel, supra note 55, at 119. Compliance with NEPA means investing a
substantial amount of time in drafting an environmental impact statement. Id.
Typically, an agency completes several drafts that are revised after each comment
period. Id. Thus, final drafts of impact statements that consider all environmental
consequences can be over one hundred pages long. Id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.7
(establishing page limits for environmental impact statements).
163. See Ferester, supra note 2, at 225. Regardless of NEPA mandates, many
federal agencies do not implement the environmental impact statement process
into their normal practice. Id. at 225-26. In fact, it has been suggested that long
term trends imply "that agencies believe that they need not follow NEPA's [envi-
ronmental impact statement] procedures as closely as they once did." Id. at 226.
164. See Riechel, supra note 55, at 119-20. NEPA and environmental impact
statement procedures have notoriously raised an abundance of litigation issues. Id.
In fact, many experts contend that "more litigation has occurred under NEPA than
any other environmental law." Ferester, supra note 2, at 227. Thus, federal agen-
cies can lessen litigation time and costs by halting "environmentally destructive
proposals at the agency level." Riechel, supra note 55, at 120.
165. See generally Ferester, supra note 2, at 209-10 (discussing state statutes with
similar procedures as NEPA). Even if alternative statutes are used in place of
NEPA, courts will still need to enforce NEPA procedures if specific agency statutes
or administrative processes do not adequately effectuate NEPA's purposes. Id. at
21.0. The courts' active role would be to compel federal agencies to prepare im-
pact statements and to review the statements to ensure that the agency made a
viable effort to consider environmental effects. Id. Idealistically, a statute could be
totally effective and unambiguous regarding the application of NEPA, if Congress
drafts exceptions directly into the legislation indicating when NEPA procedures
are unnecessary. See Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(recognizing that individual statutes, such as Clean Air Act, can provide satisfactory
environmental evaluations).
166. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1257 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted
that in creating the functional equivalence test it was not creating a broad exemp-
34
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol7/iss2/4
DOUGLAS CouNmr
for NEPA for a variety of reasons. First, the application of the test is
limited to environmental agencies or other federal agencies acting
under legislation that addresses environmental questions. 167 Sec-
ond, when a statute has a functionally equivalent process, applying
both NEPA procedures and agency's statutory procedures would be
time consuming and redundant. 68 Third, the functional equiva-
lence test provides a consistent operating mechanism for courts re-
viewing NEPA applicability. 169 Douglas County IIadvances a narrow
exemption from NEPA requirements that specifically applies to crit-
ical habitat designations. 70 Uniform application of the functional
equivalence test to critical habitat designations under ESA would
satisfy environmental demands, while curbing the tendency for re-
curring disputes regarding application of NEPA to such designa-
tions. 71 As a result, NEPA's ultimate goal of fostering harmony
tion from NEPA "for all environmental agencies or even for all environmentally
protective regulatory actions." Id. Instead, the Circuit Court was establishing a
limited exclusion for "actions which are undertaken pursuant to sufficient safe-
guards so that the purpose and policies behind NEPA will necessarily be fulfilled."
Id.
167. Warren County v. North Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 287 (E.D.N.C. 1981)
(citing Environmental Defense Fund v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 661 n.5. (D.D.C.
1978)). This can mean that an agency, such as EPA, inherently deals with environ-
mental concerns in its day-to-day activities. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckel-
shaus, 486 F.2d 375, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974), appeal
after remand sub nom. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1025 (1975), and reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 1092 (1976).
Further, the functional equivalence doctrine can extend to statutory provisions
that require an agency to explore environmental issues. See Amoco Oil, 501 F.2d at
750. Congress supported these contentions by expressly exempting EPA from pre-
paring impact statements when the administering statute already takes into ac-
count an evaluation process similar to NEPA. Geneslaw, supra note 4, at 128.
168. See Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 781 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987); Wyoming v. Hathaway, 525 F.2d 66, 71-72 (10th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied sub nom. Wyoming v. Kleppe, 426 U.S. 906 (1976); Environmental Defense
Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1254-56 (D.C. Cir. 1973). For a discussion of time
restraints foreclosing preparation of environmental impact statements, see supra
notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
169. See Bolduan, supra note 5, at 332. "Judicial review has always been an
integral part of the environmental decision making process." Id. Therefore,
courts will continue to have a major role in determining whether NEPA should be
applicable to specific sections of a statute. Id. The ultimate goal should be to
reach a uniform consensus of when NEPA applies to avoid excess and redundant
litigation. Id.
170. Douglas County II, 48 F.3d at 1507-08.
171. See Warren County, 528 F. Supp. at 286 (citations omitted). While uni-
formity would be an optimum result, the application of the functional equivalence
test can vary "depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Mont-
rose, supra note 104, at 875. Courts can, however, attempt to maintain a sense of
consistency by looking at two components of the agency's record: "first, whether
the agency has fulfilled its substantive NEPA duty of balancing environmental costs
against benefits; and, second, whether the agency has employed public participa-
1996]
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between humans and the environment can be achieved when "the
government, the judiciary, and individuals. . . each do their part to
ensure that environmental concerns are addressed with the atten-
tion they deserve."' 72
Melaney Payne
tion procedures (to] commensurate with the complexity of its proposed action
and within the time available for planning. Id. (citation omitted).
172. Hartmann, supra note 42, at 710.
36
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol7/iss2/4
